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1 The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge
for the
Western District of Missouri.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-3376
___________
United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the Western
* District of Missouri.
Jacob A. Kanatzar, *
*
Appellant. *
___________
Submitted: January 13, 2004
Filed: June 7, 2004
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Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,
Circuit Judges.
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MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
After the district court 1 denied
his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an inventory search of the vehicle that he was driving, Jacob Kanatzar conditionally
pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Mr. Kanatzar to 90 months in prison, and he appeals the denial of his
suppression motion and his sentence. We affirm.
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I.
Mr. Kanatzar contends that his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when
the police impounded a vehicle that he was driving and conducted an inventory search. We review the district court's factual
findings for clear error and its conclusion that the police did not violateMr. Kanatzar's fourth amendment rights de novo. See United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 286-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
The district court adopted the following factual findings of the magistrate judge. Two Kansas City, Missouri,
police officers were on routine patrol in an unmarked police car when the driver of a Chevrolet Caprice (later identified
as Mr. Kanatzar) made a double-lane change directly in front of their vehicle withoutsignaling. After the Caprice turned onto
a side street, the police stopped it. One of the officers, Jason Crump, approached Mr. Kanatzar, informed him of the traffic
violation, and asked for a driver's license, which he was unable to produce. OfficerKrump then asked Mr. Kanatzar to step
out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for an illegal lane change and failure to have his driver's license. Some time
during this interaction, Mr. Kanatzar informed the officer that he lived in Wichita, Kansas.
In the meantime, the other officer determined that the driving privileges of the vehicle's passenger had been
suspended.
The police decided to impound the vehicle because Mr. Kanatzar was from out of state and was under arrest and
going to jail where he would be required to post bond, the passenger did not have a valid driver's license, and the vehicle
was parked in a "high crime area with a high incidence of auto thefts and break-ins." During an inventory search of the vehicle,
the police uncovered three firearms, along with fake I.D.'s, printers, scanners, ski masks, and a large amount of cash.
The Kansas City Police Department's "general towing requirements" provide that "[v]ehicles shall be towed,"
inter alia, "when the owner/operator
is not
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considered to be a responsible person, is unable to operate the vehicle, and is unable to exercise any of [three]
options": "[d]rive the vehicle to a police facility," "[r]elease the vehicle to a qualified driver," or "[s]ign an Authorization
Not to Tow Vehicle ... allowing the arresting officer to leave the vehicle legally parked at the arrest scene."
The police department guidelines also provide that an officer has "discretion" to decide whether to permit an
arrested driver to leave his or her vehicle at the scene of an arrest, and that "[g]ood judgment will be used before a vehicle
is allowed to remain parked at an arrest scene, [and] [c]onsideration will be given to [among other things] area crime rate."
The district court concluded that the officers had complied with police department procedures and did not violate Mr. Kanatzar's
fourth amendment rights by impounding the vehicle and making an inventory of its contents.
The police may impound vehicles "[i]n the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called
'community caretaking functions.' " See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). Officers are permitted to exercise their discretion in deciding
whether to impound a vehicle, so long as that discretion is "exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Colorado v.
Burdine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
In his brief, Mr. Kanatzar acknowledges that it was "within Officer Crump's discretion" to impound the Caprice
or to leave it where it was parked. He contends, however, that the officers should not have based their decision on the fact
that the carwas parked in a high-crime area or that Mr. Kanatzar was from out of state. Although Mr. Kanatzar relies on a
Seventh Circuit case to argue that the degree of crime in the area should not be considered when determining whether to impound
a vehicle, seeUnited States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1996), we (as well as other circuit courts) have considered the likelihood of theft
or vandalism when determining the reasonableness of an impoundment. See e.g.,
United States v. Garner, 181 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1119 (2000); see also United States
-4 v. Kornegay,
885 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990); United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). In addition, in Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 n.7, the Supreme Court noted that a police directive prohibiting parking a
vehicle (rather than impounding it) " 'where there is reasonable risk of damage or vandalism' ... protect[ed] the vehicle
and its contents and minimize[d] claims of property loss."
Another appropriate police consideration here was the absence of anyone immediately available to drive the Caprice.
See United States v. Stephens,
350 F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1240
(8th Cir.1993). We have said that the "[p]olice may take protective custody of a vehicle when they have arrested
its occupants," id., and they
may "take immediate possession and secure the vehicle" when the driver does not have a valid driver'slicense, Stephens, 350 F.3d at 780. Although Mr. Kanatzar's
passenger was not arrested, she was unable to drive the car because her license had been suspended, and we believe, moreover,
that the fact that Mr. Kanatzar was from Wichita made it less likely that the police could quickly locate someone else to
take custody of the vehicle.
Mr. Kanatzar also argues in his brief that even though the police department "had a written policy directing
a content inventory of all vehicles being towed, Officer Crump clearly had an investigative motive to search Mr. Kanatzar's
vehicle"because he testified that "he believed Mr. Kanatzar was attempting to conceal his identity." We conclude, however,
that after the decision was made to impound the vehicle, the law permitted an inventory search consistent with police procedures
to protect Mr. Kanatzar's property and to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property and from potential
danger. See Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 369; see also United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 969 (2003). Even if the officer had another motive, the "presence of an investigative motive
does not invalidate an otherwise valid inventory search." Garner, 181 F.3d at 991-92.
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We conclude that the police did not act unreasonably in deciding to impound the vehicle and in conducting an
inventory search. For all of the reasons stated, we uphold the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.
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